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ESSAY
PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE IN 2050:
A LOOK BACK
TED SCHNEYER *
This piece was originally commissioned by the American Bar Associa-
tion Center for Professional Responsibility. Along with two companion
pieces reflecting varying perspectives on the same subject, it was
presented as part of the Seventeenth Annual Conference on Professional
Responsibility, presented at Scottsdale, Arizona June 6-9, 199L It ap-
pears here with the permission of the American Bar Association.
About a year ago, in April 2049, accountants from the regional office
of the National Disciplinary Commission for Lawyers and Allied Profes-
sionals ("NDCLAP") conducted a random audit of redacted client bill-
ings at the Phoenix office of Skadden, Gibson--one of the Big Eleven.
The office came out smelling almost like roses used to smell; only eight
instances of "churning" or presumptive overbilling were identified. After
negotiations with NDCLAP prosecutors, always a preferable alternative
to formal proceedings, Skadden, Gibson made restitution to the affected
clients. The firm also accepted a modest fine along with a notice of disci-
pline in the National Law Review. That notice depressed the price of the
firm's stock, of course, but only briefly and not by much. While the mat-
ter was pending before NDCLAP, Skadden, Gibson conducted its own
investigation to identify and internally discipline the lawyers or allied
professionals who had padded their hours or charged for unnecessary
work. The firm's management also decided, on grounds of undue ethical
risk, to modify its policy of requiring lawyers to bill 2300 hours a year,
even though no one knew for sure whether that policy had encouraged
the padding of hours.
Anyone familiar with NDCLAP's work will find the Skadden, Gibson
matter utterly routine. Still, as we hit mid-century, it might be well to
rehearse the developments that have shaped the handling of such a case.
It may surprise you to learn that professional discipline used to operate
quite differently.
I. THE BIRTH OF NDCLAP
First, the disciplinary system used to be administered by the state
supreme courts and their agencies, often the state bars, rather than by
NDCLAP. The first catalyst for the change to NDCLAP was a shift in
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the types of grievances against lawyers. This shift made it implausible
for state supreme courts to claim special expertise in regulating profes-
sional conduct. After turn-of-the-century reforms finally contained the
"litigation explosion," only a modest percentage of lawyer wrongdoing
occurred in judicial proceedings. Moreover, trial courts and administra-
tive tribunals dealt with most of that wrongdoing directly-through dis-
qualification, contempt, or sanctions under the Rules of Procedure. Even
when the trial courts did refer lawyer misconduct to an outside agency,
they were apt to send it to the National Boards of Trial or Criminal
Advocacy for decertification proceedings, not to the state disciplinary
bodies.
The lion's share of the complaints against lawyers in.the late 20th cen-
tury involved false advertising, fee abuse, neglect, misappropriation, and
lack of communication. Here, the chief victims were unsophisticated,
individual clients, who, today are protected from such professional over-
reaching primarily by the internal security offices of the Legal Mainte-
nance Organizations ("LMO's")-the closed-panel group legal service
plans to which most people subscribe. (These plans can simply drop of-
fending providers from their rolls, which is the kiss of professional
death.) During the 1990's, although the bar continued to view these
forms of wrongdoing as ethical problems, the public came to see them as
"consumer" problems, much like the problems customers used to en-
counter with auto mechanics. Accordingly, by the year 2000, the state
supreme courts found themselves in fierce competition with state and
federal consumer protection agencies for jurisdiction over cases involving
lawyer wrongdoing.
Some of the most egregious professional misconduct has always arisen
in transactional work and regulatory compliance work for business cli-
ents, work far removed from the courts. Often, the victims of this mis-
conduct are not clients but unwitting third parties or the government
itself, as when a tax lawyer helps a company take unwarranted tax de-
ductions. Because disciplinary enforcement used to be almost completely
reactive rather than proactive-i.e., enforcers used to wait for complaints
before investigating-and because most complaints came from clients,
this was a very minor part of the 20th-century disciplinary docket. But
the public came to regard the reactive philosophy of lawyer discipline as
unacceptable in the wake of the Savings and Loan crisis of the 1990's,
when law firms were widely criticized for blinking at the shenanigans of
their banking clients. Today, with NDCLAP initiating many of its own
investigations, randomly auditing the work of all practice entities, and
requiring extensive compliance reports, disciplinary enforcement for the
benefit of nonclients is much more important than it once was.
By the year 2000, the volume of transactional and compliance work
was tremendous, partly because law firms were pushing the lawyering
envelope toward what were then called "ancillary" businesses. Lawyers
came to do most of this work in tandem with allied professionals in large
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law firms or in corporate legal departments. This work had much more
to do with federal agencies like the EPA, SEC, IRS, OTS, and PDQ than
with the state supreme courts. These agencies began to set up their own
programs for disciplining the professionals practicing before them. The
organized bar bitterly opposed these programs on the ground that the
agencies were using professional discipline as a pretext to enlist lawyers
as watchdogs against their own clients. Under the circumstances, an in-
dependent federal disciplinary agency became a tolerable compromise.
The state supreme courts' disciplinary jurisdiction had always been
tied to their authority to license lawyers. The second catalyst for change
to NDCLAP-administered discipline occurred when Congress federal-
ized licensing for lawyers in 2010. The political alliance that produced
federal licensing reflected the fragmentation of the modem bar. "Feder-
alist" bar groups stressed the need for lawyer mobility in serving national
clients, the uniformity of modem American law, and the seemingly arbi-
trary discrepancy in state bar exam pass rates. Among the federalists
were the American Bar Association ("ABA") Business Law Section, the
voice of the mega-firms; the American Corporate Counsel Association
("ACCA"), representing the 20% of the bar who by 2010 worked in-
house for national and multinational corporations; the Federal Bar Asso-
ciation, consisting of lawyers who worked for or practiced before federal
agencies; and the National Legal Specialty Boards-private certification
bodies that began to flower after 1990, when the Supreme Court gave
lawyers a constitutional right to advertise the fact that they were pri-
vately certified as specialists.' The losers in the debate over national li-
censing, the "antifederalists," were the state supreme courts and bar
associations and the now defunct ABA General Practice Section, the
home of the "little lawyer."
When licensing went federal, Congress also adopted the Federal Code
of Lawyering ("Federal Code"), drafted under the auspices of the Na-
tional Organization of Disciplinary Officials, formerly the Organization
of Bar Counsel. Drawing heavily on the Restatement (Second) of the
Law Governing Lawyers, the Federal Code set truly uniform national
standards for lawyers, as the ABA's ethics codes had never quite suc-
ceeded in doing. For a brief time, Federal Code enforcement was severed
from licensing and remained local. Each lawyer still had to designate a
home state and accept the disciplinary jurisdiction of that state's supreme
court. But in 2015, when it became clear both that some states were
enforcing the Federal Code much more actively than others and that the
state supreme courts often disagreed over how to interpret the Federal
Code, discipline also went federal. Help Abolish Legal Tyranny
("HALT"), a consumer organization, and the Attorneys' Liability As-
surance Society ("ALAS"), the dominant malpractice insurer, success-
1. Peel v. illinois Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. 2281
(1990).
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fully lobbied Congress for this change. HALT argued that the organized
bar had "captured" some state supreme courts and turned them into pa-
per tigers. ALAS contended that an effective national disciplinary pro-
cess was the best way to prevent crushing malpractice claims. In setting
up a federal disciplinary system, Congress allowed the state courts to
continue to protect the integrity of their own processes by sanctioning
lawyers for misbehavior in those courts, as the federal courts had always
done. Everything else, including consumer problems, went to
NDCLAP.
The third catalyst for the change to NDCLAP was a funding crisis.
Beginning with the ABA's Clark Report2 in 1970, and especially after
the McKay Report3 in 1991, the philosophy of lawyer discipline
changed. The old emphasis had been on "cleansing the profession," re-
moving the few bad apples who committed serious offenses. This was
cheap; annual spending on discipline in the U.S. as late as 1975 was only
$18 per lawyer. But "cleansing," for all its attention to the honor of the
legal profession, was not responsive to most of the public's concerns
about lawyers. And so, it gave way to a philosophy of deterrence and
rehabilitation, a philosophy supported by the aggressive new breed of bar
counsel who were increasingly making careers of investigating and prose-
cuting disciplinary cases. The disciplinary process in this period became
user-friendly, with intake personnel helping clients prepare complaints.
It also began to respond even to minor grievances. As a result, the
number of lawyers sanctioned during the 1990's rose considerably faster
than did bar membership, though disbarments and suspensions-the
traditional "cleansing" sanctions-dwindled in favor of public censure,
restitution, probation, and eventually fines.
The more responsive the disciplinary process became, the more griev-
ances it received. The expense of processing every grievance in a timely
fashion became enormous, despite the creation of a "fast track" for mi-
nor offenses and the diversion of many cases to fee and malpractice arbi-
tration panels or to special counseling programs for lawyers afflicted with
poor office management skills, substance abuse problems, or what came
to be called "incivility syndrome." By 1996, led by developments in Cal-
ifornia before the Big Quake, the average annual disciplinary outlay per
lawyer swelled to $1000.
Lacking any general taxing power, the state supreme courts had to
cover this expense by charging lawyers ever-higher annual license fees,
though some courts generated modest additional revenues by making
2. ABA Special Comm. on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, Problems and
Recommendations in Disciplinary Enforcement (Final Draft 1970) (The report is com-
monly named for the chair of the drafting committee, Supreme Court Justice Tom
Clark).
3. ABA Comm'n on Evaluation of Professional Enforcement, Report to the House
of Delegates (1991) (This report is commonly named for the original chair of the commis-
sion, legal educator Robert McKay).
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fines a disciplinary sanction. The license fees squared nicely with the
benefit principle of public finance-the principle that providers and their
clients rather than the general public should pay for professional regula-
tion. But as the financial burden grew, many lawyers began to argue that
all citizens, not just lawyers and clients, had an interest in the quality of
the legal system and thus benefitted from the disciplinary process. This
implied that license fees should be supplemented by general appropria-
tions from state legislatures. Some state legislatures began to make ap-
propriations, thereby reducing the financial burden on the bar. They
insisted, however, on satisfying themselves that their appropriations were
well spent. By 2005, state legislatures were as involved as the courts in
overseeing lawyer discipline. By the time control shifted to NDCLAP in
2015, the old argument that only courts should regulate the practice of
law sounded quaint indeed.
II. ENTY DISCIPLnE
In addition to illustrating our postmodern reliance on federal disci-
pline, the Skadden, Gibson matter illustrates our emphasis on the prac-
tice entity rather than on the individual practitioner as a disciplinary
target. Lawyers a century ago would have been shocked by the idea. As
late as 1950, a majority of American lawyers practiced alone and even
the lawyers who practiced in firms were by our standards only loosely
organized. Today, of course, the sole practitioner is as extinct as the bald
eagle. And thanks to the mergers and internal growth that accelerated so
dramatically after 1980, nearly 90% of today's lawyers practice in enti-
ties employing at least 200 professionals. These entities include prosecu-
tors' and defenders' offices, legal services programs, law departments in
corporations, government agencies, LMO's, and, of course, law firms.
As practice entities grew to their present size, they began to look and
behave like the large corporations that some of them actually became.
Most legal tasks were assigned to teams. Entity governance became a
matter of departments, committees, formal rules, policy manuals, stan-
dard operating procedures, long chains of command, and lay administra-
tors. Many ethically sensitive tasks-fee setting, file maintenance,
billing, public relations, calendaring, handling of client funds and prop-
erty, and avoiding conflicts of interest--came to be performed by central
staff, not by the lawyers who directly serviced clients. In short, the deliv-
ery of legal services became highly bureaucratized. In this climate, ethi-
cal lawyering seemed to depend more on the culture, structure, policies,
and procedures of an entity than on the values of individual lawyers.
Policymakers began to dimly perceive the disciplinary implications of
all this in the 1970's and 80's. Though the disciplinary agencies of the
period only had jurisdiction over individuals, a few curious provisions in
the old ABA Code of Professional Responsibility were addressed to law
firms as well as lawyers. An example was DR 9-102(A), requiring law-
yers and law firms to keep client funds in trust accounts. In 1983, the
1991]
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Model Rules of Professional Conduct went further and began to turn
issues of entity governance into ethical issues. Most notably, Model
Rules 5.1(a) and 5.3 imposed on managing lawyers a duty to ensure that
all lawyers and employees in their offices behaved ethically.
These governance provisions in the Model Rules, along with pressure
from malpractice insurers, propelled us into the era of law office "moni-
toring." By 1998, for example, all but the smallest firms used new busi-
ness committees and sophisticated data bases to avoid conflicts, and
maintained ethics committees to decide other sensitive questions. In ret-
rospect, we can see that the development of such monitoring techniques
took longer than it should have because the governance provisions of the
Model Rules could at first be enforced only against individual lawyers.
The trouble was that disciplinary authorities never knew which lawyers
to blame when, for example, a firm became embroiled in a conflict be-
cause it lacked an appropriate intake procedure. Only a firm collectively,
and not specific individuals, could be blamed for a structural or policy
defect of this sort, but the agencies had no authority to proceed against
firms.
Pointing out the problem, a seminal article in Cornell Law Review' in
1991 called for expanding disciplinary jurisdiction to include law firms
and other practice entities. Drawing an analogy to the federal regulation
of corporate crime, the article suggested that practice entities be subject
to discipline not just for collective monitoring failures, but vicariously for
the misconduct of the individuals working within them, even when com-
plainants and disciplinary authorities could not show exactly just which
lawyers had misbehaved, something that became harder to show once the
bulk of legal work was done in teams. By proceeding against a firm, the
article noted, disciplinary agencies could avoid scapegoating a particular
lawyer for sins that might just as easily have been committed by others in
the firm. A disciplined entity, the article added, could generally decide
for itself whether to adopt new monitoring procedures and whether to
discipline specific providers internally. That is more or less what hap-
pened in the Skadden, Gibson case.
Entity discipline found its way into the law by the year 2000. The
Model Rules were amended to address entities as well as individuals. At
first, the state supreme courts gained jurisdiction over practice entities
simply by requiring licensed individuals to work only for organizations
that made themselves amenable to the disciplinary process. Then, in
2020, NDCLAP established a true system of entity licensing, much like
the system that the SEC had long used to regulate brokerage houses.5
After that, discipline was funded partly by a Congressional appropriation
and partly by an annual tax on all practice entities, proportioned to the
number of lawyers and allied professionals working for the entity.
4. Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 Cornell L. Rev. - (1991).
5. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1988).
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The modem focus on entities as disciplinary targets has, of course,
affected the mix of disciplinary sanctions. Firm dissolution, the analogy
to disbarment, is almost unheard of; it makes no sense except in response
to a chronic and pervasive pattern of institutional wrongdoing. On the
other hand, fines are common, because law firms as such have proven
more attentive to their bottom lines and better able to pay than individ-
ual lawyers. Public censure has also proven to be an effective sanction,
since well-known practice entities have a huge stake in preserving their
institutional reputations; firms with good ethical track records find it
much easier than others to hold onto good lawyers and clients alike.
Some firms are placed on "preventive" probation until they adopt the
monitoring or hiring practices that NDCLAP considers essential to pre-
vent further wrongdoing. Often, a combination of these sanctions is im-
posed, typically after negotiations between NDCLAP and firm
management, as in the Skadden, Gibson case.
To maximize detection and minimize administrative expense, ND-
CLAP rules call for a substantial reduction in discipline whenever a
practice entity comes forward and reports its own ethical violations.
This carrot has proven much more effective than the 20th-century stick
of requiring lawyers to report violations.6 It has even encouraged prac-
tice entities to form their own ethical compliance offices, which in turn
help to prevent wrongdoing. Sanctions are also reduced whenever an
accused firm can show that it had appropriate monitoring procedures in
place at the time of an underlying infraction by a "rogue" lawyer.
All these developments in entity discipline were presaged by the
United States Sentencing Commission's treatment in 1991 of an analo-
gous subject-criminal sanctions for organizational offenders.' Ironi-
cally, the Sentencing Commission's guidelines for organizational
sanctions had a greater impact on the evolution of lawyer discipline in
the United States than the ABA's McKay Commission, whose report
was published the very same year. You might want to examine both
reports in the Archives.
6. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 8.3(a) (1983).
7. U.S. Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Guidelines for Organizational Defend-
ants, 49 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2059 (May 8, 1991).
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